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What We Regret Most . . . and Why
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Which domains in life produce the greatest potential for regret,
and what features of those life domains explain why? Using
archival and laboratory evidence, the authors show that greater
perceived opportunity within life domains evokes more intense
regret. This pattern is consistent with previous publications dem-
onstrating greater regret stemming from high rather than low
opportunity or choice. A meta-analysis of 11 regret ranking stud-
ies revealed that the top six biggest regrets in life center on (in
descending order) education, career, romance, parenting, the
self, and leisure. Study Set 2 provided new laboratory evidence
that directly linked the regret ranking to perceived opportunity.
Study Set 3 ruled out an alternative interpretation involving
framing effects. Overall, these findings show that people’s biggest
regrets are a reflection of where in life they see their largest oppor-
tunities; that is, where they see tangible prospects for change,
growth, and renewal.
Keywords: regret; counterfactual; cognitive dissonance; decision
making; emotion
A life lived is a life replete with choices. Some go well,
some go wrong, and those gone wrong spell regret. You
could have done it differently . . . should have said some-
thing else . . . and you might have come out ahead.
Recent research on regret has pinpointed numerous
cognitive consequences, including effects on blame,
expectancies, superstition, suspicion, and ongoing
behavior (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; Roese, 1997,
2005). When looking across life as a whole, what do peo-
ple regret most? Which aspects of life, career versus
romance, school versus children, spirituality versus
money, come most vividly to mind, perhaps to haunt the
individual for extended periods of time? And why?
This article addresses these questions in three ways.
First, several previous studies have reported rankings of
people’s biggest regrets in life, but until now there has
not been an integrative summary of those findings.
Accordingly, we present a meta-analysis of these findings
using a 12-category framework of life domains; this
framework is also used in our laboratory studies. Second,
we account for why this ranking occurs by pointing to an
opportunity principle, apparent in several lines of recent
research that have not previously been summarized
together. By opportunity, we mean an open rather than
closed door to further action in the service of correction,
advancement, and betterment, defined in terms of the
individual’s perception of situational features or per-
sonal talents that enable such pursuit. Third, we offer
new laboratory evidence that builds a bridge between
these two previously separate bodies of work.
Regrets Big and Small
Regret has been defined as a negative emotion predi-
cated on an upward, self-focused, counterfactual infer-
ence (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995; Zeelenberg, 1999).
Regret feels bad because it implies a fault in personal
action: You should have done it differently, hence self-
blame is a component of regret (Connolly &
Zeelenberg, 2002). The vast majority of research on
regret has focused on structural properties, such as the
distinction between regrets of inaction versus action,
and on the effects of anticipated and felt regret on deci-
sion making. A handful of publications have taken a dif-
ferent approach, that of content analyzing regrets to give
an indication of where in life regrets persist.
In the meta-analytic summary that follows, we see that
Americans’ six biggest regrets fall into the following life
domains (in descending order of frequency): education,
career, romance, parenting, self-improvement, and lei-
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sure (see Figure 1). But why should this particular rank-
ing occur? Indeed, that education appears as the num-
ber one regret of Americans is a remarkably consistent
finding across these studies (e.g., should have stayed in
school, should have studied harder, should have gotten
another degree). Why might this be so? We argue that
one answer to this question may be derived from a variety
of recent findings that converge on the principle that
opportunity breeds regret. An impressive range of find-
ings support this idea, and a major goal of this article is to
apply this principle to an understanding of what we
regret most.
The Opportunity Principle
Opportunity breeds regret. Feelings of dissatisfaction
and disappointment are strongest where the chances for
corrective reaction are clearest. There are two reasons
for this counterintuitive finding. First, where opportu-
nity is denied, or where problematic circumstances are
inevitable, processes of cognitive dissonance, rational-
ization, and reconstrual are engaged that either termi-
nate or substantially mitigate the experience of regret.
Accordingly, regret persists in precisely those situations
in which opportunity for positive action remains high.
This perspective offers a novel explanation for why edu-
cation is the number one regret of Americans of diverse
age, socioeconomic status, and life circumstance: In con-
temporary society, education is open to continual modi-
fication throughout life. With the rise of community col-
leges and student aid programs in recent decades,
education of some sort is accessible to nearly all
socioeconomic groups. You can always go back to school.
A second and more basic reason underlying this
opportunity principle is that regret spurs further correc-
tive action. Regret pushes people toward revised deci-
sion making and corrective action that often bring
improvement in life circumstances (Zeelenberg, 1999).
For example, Zeelenberg and Pieters (1999) measured
regret in response to negative experiences with service
providers (e.g., taxis, restaurants) and showed that
regret predicted subsequent switching to new service
providers (see also Zeelenberg, Inman, & Pieters, 2001).
Moreover, regret is predicated on an upward counter-
factual inference, and both laboratory and field research
indicate that upward counterfactual thinking elicits sub-
sequent performance improvement by way of its inferen-
tial implications for behavioral modification (Morris &
Moore, 2000; Nasco & Marsh, 1999; Roese, 1994). These
findings reveal that regret often initiates corrective
action, but clearly, individuals are more likely to under-
take corrective action when they believe it to be both
possible and effective.
At least five separate lines of recent research converge
on this opportunity principle. Perhaps the clearest
experimental demonstration was conducted by
Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, and McMullen (1993),
who manipulated the outcomes experienced by partici-
pants playing a computer-presented blackjack game.
Negative outcomes evoked more upward counterfactual
thoughts (and hence more regret) than positive out-
comes, but this effect was qualified by whether partici-
pants had the opportunity to play another round. Such
opportunity to “fix the situation next time” increased the
tendency to generate upward counterfactuals, and these
authors interpreted their findings in terms of the useful-
ness of channeling insights into how the past might have
been improved into subsequent opportunities. By the
same token, outcomes perceived to be more controlla-
ble also evoke more upward counterfactual thoughts
than less controllable outcomes (Roese & Olson, 1995).
Second, a recent experimental demonstration
focused on whether decisions may be subsequently
revised, as when consumers return purchased goods for
a refund (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002). Using the guise of a
photography class, participants selected their own pho-
tographs to keep, but this decision was reversible for
some (i.e., they could change their mind and keep a dif-
ferent photo) and irreversible for others. Irreversible
decisions aroused greater dissonance reduction (or to
use their terminology, activation of a psychological
immune system), thereby elevating decision satisfaction.
With reversible decisions however, the recognition of
opportunity for further rectification interfered with dis-
sonance reduction, resulting in reduced satisfaction.
Although not a study of regret per se, this research sug-
gests that regret persists in those situations that are per-
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Figure 1 What we regret most (meta-analytic summary).
ceived to be changeable. Gilbert, Morewedge, Risen,
and Wilson (2004) demonstrated further that people
ordinarily suppress, distort, and quash many of life’s
daily regrets, typically without even realizing it. Some
smaller subset of regrets—those reflecting changeable
circumstances—are the ones that remain to haunt
people further.
In a third line of research, Gilovich, Medvec, and
Chen (1995) showed that one reason why regrets of inac-
tion persist longer than regrets of action is that cognitive
dissonance reduction is more active for the latter than
the former. Regrets of inaction (“Should have asked her
out,” “Should have become a dentist”) are more psycho-
logically “open,” more imaginatively boundless, mean-
ing that there is always more one could have done and
further riches one might have enjoyed (“She’d have
been a wonderful partner,” “It would have been reward-
ing work”). This openness to possibility (the essence of
opportunity) mitigates dissonance reduction. By con-
trast, regrets of action are psychologically fixed by their
factual status and have only one alternative (not doing
it). With the consequences of factual action plain as day,
cognitive dissonance is more readily aroused to mitigate
the sting of those consequences (Gilovich & Medvec,
1995). Thus, regrets of inaction last longer than regrets
of action in part because they reflect greater perceived
opportunity.
The number of options from which to choose was the
focus of a fourth line of research by Iyengar and Lepper
(2000). Participants given a larger number of product
options to examine and select from (e.g., 24 different fla-
vors of jam) were less likely to buy the product and also
felt less satisfaction and more frustration than those
given few options (e.g., 6 flavors). Study 3 of this article
included a measure of regret, and although regret analy-
ses were presented within an aggregate satisfaction mea-
sure, it is clear from the direction of the effect that
greater perceived opportunity (born of wider choice
options) evoked more regret (e.g., “If only I’d tried every
last jam, I might have found the perfect flavor”; see also
Schwartz, 2000).
A fifth line of research centered on age. As people
grow older, their choices become increasingly con-
strained. A new romance or a new career are open possi-
bilities for the young but somewhat more difficult for the
elderly. Wrosch and Heckhausen (2002) discovered that
older individuals produce regrets focusing only rarely
on personal action. As their own opportunities fade with
advancing years, so too do the most painful and self-
recriminating regrets, to be replaced instead by “neu-
tered” regrets that emphasize the actions of other peo-
ple. In short, this analysis of age effects showed that with
diminishing opportunity comes diminished regret.
Current Research
Based on these previous demonstrations, we suggest
that the domains in life that contain people’s biggest
regrets are those marked by the greatest opportunity for
corrective action. The research was designed to bridge
these two previously unrelated lines of research on
regret rankings versus the opportunity principle. The
first study is a meta-analysis of previously published
regret rankings. The next two studies are laboratory
investigations of the role of opportunity in regret inten-
sity, positioned within the framework of life domains.
Finally, three studies are briefly summarized that rule
out an alternative interpretation of the opportunity
principle centering on framing effects.
STUDY 1: META-ANALYSIS
Between 1989 and 2003, nine papers were published
containing tabulations of life regrets. The first published
report, by Kinnier and Metha (1989), required partici-
pants to look over their whole life and if they could live it
again, to check as many as 3 aspects of their life that they
would change from a list 8 life domains.1 The sample
consisted of adults of varying ages and occupations
approached by graduate counseling students as part of a
class project. Landman and Manis (1992) used the same
measurement strategy in the following three samples:
undergraduates, adult women who had contacted the
University of Michigan Women’s Center, and a collec-
tion of adults culled from a motor vehicle licensing data-
base. DeGenova (1992) asked a representative sample of
elderly residents of Lafayette, Indiana, what aspects of
their lives they would change if they could; respondents
gave ratings of desired change for 35 life domains.
Gilovich and Medvec’s (1994) Study 2 was a survey of
people’s biggest regrets in life, later content coded by
hypothesis-blind judges. Participants ranged from
undergraduates to clerical staff to emeritus professors at
Cornell University. In a fascinating follow-up from that
same Cornell team, Hattiangadi, Medvec, and Gilovich
(1995) reanalyzed data from the Terman genius study—
a multidecade longitudinal study of highly intelligent
individuals initiated by Lewis Terman in 1921. The
respondents were elderly when they completed the 1986
survey that indicated that even the intellectually gifted
suffer the same sorts of regrets in life as the average per-
son. Landman, Vandewater, Stewart, and Malley (1995)
also used secondary data collected in 1986, this time
consisting of adult female participants of a multidecade
longitudinal study of life issues and values. These respon-
dents were about 43 years old at the time of data collec-
tion. Lecci, Okun, and Karoly (1994) sampled commu-
nity college students, and Wrosch and Heckhausen
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(2002) sampled Berliners recruited via newspaper
advertisements; both studies asked participants to
describe regrets that were later categorized into life
domains by hypothesis-blind judges. Jokisaari (2003)
asked students in Finland to record three different life
regrets, which independent coders later categorized
into 11 life domains.
Overall, five data sets used the method of having par-
ticipants select their biggest regrets from a list provided
by the researchers (DeGenova, 1992; Kinnier & Metha,
1989; Landman & Manis, 1992, Samples 1 and 2;
Landman et al., 1995); the remainder used the strategy
of having participants record regrets, with independent
coders subsequently assigning them to life domain cate-
gories. Also, in three of the data sets (Landman et al.,
1995; Lecci et al., 1994; Wrosch & Heckhausen, 2002),
the researchers restricted their measure to regrets of
inaction, whereas the remainder were neutral with
regard to soliciting both regrets of action and inaction.
Method
Data sets. We examined nine published journal arti-
cles containing a total of 11 data sets (all reported 1 data
set, with the exception of Landman & Manis, 1992, who
reported 3). These articles were identified using stan-
dard computer literature search (PsycInfo, SSCI) and
also by e-mail canvassing of experts on the study of
regret. Together, these data sets comprised 3,041 partici-
pants who provided, rated, or checked off a total of 4,054
distinct regrets. Overall, women were overrepresented
relative to men (73% of all participants; 2,216 women
and 819 men).2
Some studies required participants to report a single
regret, whereas others permitted participants to nomi-
nate multiple regrets from various life domains. To com-
bine across these different methodologies, we used the
regret as the unit of analysis for each study, computing
the proportion of all regrets that fell within each of the
life domain categories.
Coding. One challenge of this analysis was that the life
domain categories used in these studies differed.
Although on the whole there was remarkable agreement
of category structure, alignment was not perfect. For
example, Landman and Manis (1992) used 4 categories,
Lecci et al. (1994) used 11 categories, and DeGenova
(1992) used 35 categories (across 11 data sets, mean
number of categories = 14.8). To average across the stud-
ies, we required a common framework for categorizing
life domains. We drew on prior theoretical conceptual-
izations of the domains of life priorities (e.g., Cummins,
1996; Frisch, Cornell, Villanueva, & Retzlaff, 1992; Oishi
& Diener, 2001) to derive a 12-category framework of life
domains, intended both to be representative of this
prior theoretical work and also to map maximally onto
the majority of the ad hoc categorical schemes used
within the reviewed studies. Our 12-category framework
is summarized in Table 1.
We then matched each category of tabulated regret
from each study to 1 or more of these 12 categories.
Where individual studies drew finer categorical distinc-
tions, we simply summed the frequencies according to
the 12-category framework. Where studies drew broader
distinctions that overlapped 2 or more of the categories
in the 12-category scheme, we distributed the frequency
evenly across those categories. For example, in
Hattiangadi et al. (1995), 1 regret category was “should
have emphasized social relationships,” which received a
count of 13 regrets overall (p. 180). This could be inter-
preted as fitting the categories of family, friends, or
romance; it therefore was assigned a count of 4.33 to
each of these categories.
Results
With total number of regrets tabulated for each cate-
gory for each data set, we then computed proportions of
total regrets for each category, weighted these by sample
size, then computed the weighted within-category aver-
age proportion. These means for each category within
each study appear in Table 2. The weighted average pro-
portion of all sample regrets then constituted the basis of
the ranking of what people regret most, depicted in Fig-
ure 1 and with further detail provided in the first column
of Table 3.
Education is the number one life regret, accounting
for 32.2% of all reported regrets (SD = 1.89). This is a
strikingly consistent finding, confirmed by a wide mar-
gin in all but two data sets (those exceptions being
Landman et al., 1995, and Data Set 3 of Landman &
Manis, 1992). Career ranked number two (22.3%, SD =
3.28), romance ranked number three (14.8%, SD =
2.34), parenting ranked number four (10.2%, SD =
2.17), self ranked five (5.47%, SD = 2.52), and leisure
ranked six (2.55%, SD = 2.34). These top six biggest
regrets accounted for 86.4% of all regrets mentioned
across all participants. The mean proportions corre-
sponding to the top five regrets each differed signifi-
cantly from one another, as tested using one-tailed post
hoc comparisons between adjacently ranked means (ps =
.003, .02, .04, .04, in descending order of rank). The dif-
ference between the fifth and sixth ranked regrets (self
and leisure) did not differ significantly, p = .14.
The remaining six regrets were so low in frequency as
to be effectively inconsequential; they were finance
(2.46%, SD = 1.29), family (2.23%, SD = 1.19), health
(1.47%, SD = 0.84), friends (1.45%, SD = 0.75), spiritual-
ity (1.26%, SD = 1.10), and community (0.95%, SD =
0.68). Not surprisingly, none of these mean proportions
differed reliably from one another, ps > .35.
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STUDY 2A: COLLEGE STUDENTS’ REGRET RANKING
Study 2a was a laboratory survey conducted among
college students, the main goal of which was to generate
a new ranking of regrets that would serve as the bench-
mark against which the opportunity manipulation of
Study 2b, conducted among a similar sample of students
at the same university, could be gauged. That is, in Study
2b, participants were directed to focus on high and low
opportunity life domains, then to rate the intensity of
regrets falling into these life domains. We could then
observe directly whether those life domains deemed by
participants to be high in opportunity (Study 2b) were
generally the same ones identified as containing life’s
biggest regrets (Study 2a).
We noted previously that some of the meta-analyzed
studies required participants first to record a regret,
then only later was this regret categorized into a life
domain. Other studies presented participants with a list
of life domains and then were required to select domains
containing their biggest regrets. The latter procedure
may have demand characteristics in that participants
might attempt to project a favorable impression of them-
selves by expressing remorse over their lack of spiritual-
ity, for example, but may perhaps not mention such a
regret had this category not been provided to them
explicitly. Accordingly, we used the former procedure,
that of inviting participants to share a regret with no
mention of particular life domains. Later, participants
themselves categorized their regret into one of the 12
life domains.
Method
Participants were 34 (19 women, 14 men) undergrad-
uate students who completed the study in exchange for
credit in an introductory social psychology course at the
University of Illinois.
Participants were asked to record a single, vivid
regret. To bypass participants’ lay (and possibly idiosyn-
cratic) definitions, the word regret was not used in the
instructions. Rather, the following paragraph-length
description explained the regret information that we
sought:
People often see how the past might have been better.
You might have acted differently, said something differ-
ent, and subsequent events might then have unfolded in
a different way. Have you ever had one of these thoughts
about what might have been that was especially vivid,
compelling, or obvious to you? Something you couldn’t
help but think about repeatedly?
Participants were given eight lines on which to record
their vivid regret. At the bottom of the sheet of paper,
they were asked to estimate how long ago (in months)
the regret-evoking event occurred. On a separate sheet
of paper, participants were than asked to categorize their
regret into one of the 12 life domains (summarized in
Table 1). The domains were presented beside boxes;
participants were to check the box beside the selected
domain.
Results
All participants recorded one regret. The duration of
the regret (mean elapsed time since initiating incident)
was nearly 2 years (M = 22 months) but was highly vari-
able (SD = 30.5, range = .03 to 120 months).
The ranking of regrets by frequency of life domain
was (1) romance, (2) friends, (3) education, (4) leisure,
(5) self, (6) career, (7) family, (8) health, (9) spirituality,
(10) community, (11) finance, and (12) parenting. This
ranking with frequencies appears in the second column
of Table 3. This ranking differs from the meta-analytic
result of Study 1 in several nonsurprising ways. Most
young adults for example have yet to confront chal-
lenges regarding career and parenting, hence these
kinds of regrets are rare among college students. Also
different from Study 1, regrets of romance ranked high-
est among the college sample. Given that most college
students have yet to settle into committed, long-term
relationships, romance for these participants is a
domain marked by instability and large opportunity for
change. This may be further, albeit indirect, evidence
that opportunity breeds regret. Despite these minor dif-
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TABLE 1: Twelve Life Domains
1. Career: jobs, employment, earning a living (e.g., “If only I were a
dentist”)
2. Community: volunteer work, political activism (e.g., “I should
have volunteered more”)
3. Education: school, studying, getting good grades (e.g., “If only I
had studied harder in college”)
4. Parenting: interactions with offspring (e.g., “If only I’d spent
more time with my kids”)
5. Family: interactions with parents and siblings (e.g., “I wish I’d
called my mom more often”)
6. Finance: decisions about money (e.g., “I wish I’d never invested
in Enron”)
7. Friends: interactions with close others (e.g., “I shouldn’t have
told Susan that she’d gained weight”)
8. Health: exercise, diet, avoiding or treating illness (e.g., “If only I
could stick to my diet”)
9. Leisure: sports, recreation, hobbies (e.g., “I should have visited
Europe when I had the chance”)
10. Romance: love, sex, dating, marriage (e.g., “I wish I’d married
Jake instead of Edward”)
11. Spirituality: religion, philosophy, the meaning of life (e.g., “I
wish I’d found religion sooner”)
12. Self: improving oneself in terms of abilities, attitudes, behaviors
(e.g., “If only I had more self-control”)
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ferences, more striking is the overall similarity in regret
ranking between the meta-analysis of Study 1 and the col-
lege sample of Study 2a: 5 of the 6 top regrets were the
same (for college students, regrets centering on friend-
ships made it into the top 6, replacing parenting regrets
that were in the top 6 of the meta-analysis ranking).
STUDY 2B: EFFECT OF PERCEIVED
OPPORTUNITY ON REGRET INTENSITY
Study 2b was designed to test the role of opportunity
by directing participants’ focus of attention onto life
domains of high versus low opportunity. We then mea-
sured the intensity of regrets associated with those life
domains. According to our theoretical perspective, high
opportunity life domains should bring to mind higher
intensity regrets than life domains characterized by low
opportunity. Also, we expected that those life domains
nominated as high (vs. low) in opportunity would more
closely match those life domains that participants identi-
fied in Study 2a as containing their biggest regrets. Such
a demonstration would more directly connect perceived
opportunity to the findings obtained in the regret-
ranking paradigm.
Method
Participants were 121 (70 women, 49 men, 2 unspeci-
fied) students who completed the study in exchange for
credit in an introductory social psychology course at the
University of Illinois.
Participants were given a list of the same 12 life
domains used in the previous studies and asked to select
one example each marked by high and low opportunity.
The instructions in the former condition read,
Where in life do you feel you have the MOST opportu-
nity? That is, where in life do you have the greatest free-
dom to do what you want or the most effective skills that
enable you to modify circumstances for the better?
The instructions for the low opportunity condition read,
Where in life do you heave the LEAST opportunity? That
is, where in life are your choices constrained, decided
often by other people, or simply tough to put into effect?
Where in life do you feel that things are more fixed,
unchangeable, and hard to modify according to your
own desires?
Opportunity was manipulated on a within-subjects basis
and counterbalanced. Half the participants first nomi-
nated a high opportunity life domain, completed the rat-
ings listed in relation to that life domain, then nomi-
nated a low opportunity life domain, and then
completed the same ratings but this time with regard to
the low opportunity life domain. The other half of partic-
ipants completed a questionnaire in which low
opportunity preceded high opportunity.
The dependent measures were as follows. Partici-
pants completed a manipulation check rating of oppor-
tunity: “How easy is it to change or modify this part of
your life?” (using a 9-point scale with anchors labeled
very hard to change and very easy to change). Participants
were then instructed to think of a regret from this
domain. The main dependent measure centered on per-
ceived intensity of this regret: “How emotionally intense
is this regret?” (using a 9-point scale with anchors labeled
extremely weak and extremely intense). Last, mainly for
exploratory purposes, participants rated the overall
importance of the life domain: “How important is this
part of your life?” (using a 9-point scale with anchors
labeled not at all important and very important).
Results
Two kinds of results are presented. First, by looking at
the effect of high versus low opportunity on regret inten-
sity, we reach direct evidence for our conceptual expla-
nation as to where in life regrets persist. Second, by com-
paring which life domain people nominate for high
versus low opportunity against the ranking established in
Study 2a, we can draw a direct bridge from Study 2b’s
manipulation of perceived opportunity to the more stan-
dard life regret ranking procedure of Study 2a.
The rating of opportunity confirmed the success of
the manipulation. Participants rated the high opportu-
nity life domains as being both higher in opportunity
and easier to change than low opportunity domains: for
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TABLE 3: Rankings of Life Regrets Within Life Domains (Studies 1
and 2a)
Study 1 (Meta-Analysis) Study 2a (College Student Sample)
Proportion Frequency
Rank Domain (%) Rank Domain (%)
1 Education 32.2 1 Romance 26.7
2 Career 22.3 2 Friends 20.3
3 Romance 14.8 3 Education 16.7
4 Parenting 10.2 4 Leisure 10
5 Self 5.5 5 Self 10
6 Leisure 2.5 6 Career 6.7
7 Finance 2.5 7 Family 3.3
8 Family 2.3 8 Health 3.3
9 Health 1.5 9 Spirituality 3.3
10 Friends 1.5 10 Community 0
11 Spirituality 1.3 11 Finance 0
12 Community 0.95 12 Parenting 0
NOTE: The ranking for Study 1 is based on the proportion of all re-
grets mentioned that centered on a particular life domain (codings
sometimes include more than one regret per participant). The rank-
ing for Study 2a is based on the frequency with which the sole regret
cited by each participant centered on a particular life domain.
opportunity (Ms = 6.91 vs. 3.44), F(1, 118) = 314.4, p <
.001, d = 1.62; for changeability (Ms = 6.04 vs. 2.72), F(1,
118) = 256, p < .001, d = 2.05. Our main prediction was
confirmed in that high opportunity life domains con-
tained more intense regrets than low opportunity
domains (Ms = 4.68 vs. 4.16), F(1, 118) = 4.72, p = .03, d =
.21. In addition, those life domains that were high in
opportunity were also those deemed to be more person-
ally important (Ms = 7.28 vs. 6.04), F(1, 118) = 30.1, p <
.001, d = .50. This finding may reflect either the fortu-
itous circumstance of America’s educated class or simple
self-enhancement (i.e., illusion of control). Importance
and opportunity ratings appeared to be relatively
unconfounded: The correlation between opportunity
and importance ratings was .18 and .27 in the high and
low opportunity conditions, respectively. Moreover, an
examination of potential multicolinearity in a regression
equation predicting regret intensity from opportunity
and importance produced variance inflation factor val-
ues of 1.02 and 1.08, far smaller than the conventional
threshold value of 10 at which multicolinearity may be
suspected (Netter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Wasserman,
1996). In this regression (based on the difference scores
between high and low opportunity conditions), oppor-
tunity ( = .23, p = .008) and importance ( = .34, p <
.001) were significant yet independent predictors of
regret intensity.
We next isolated the 6 most frequently nominated
domains for both the high and low opportunity condi-
tions. We selected 6 as opposed to the full 12 because
those 6 domains that were least frequently cited were
mentioned by only a handful of people, resulting in fre-
quencies of close to zero (see Studies 1 and 2a for similar
observations). We next tabulated the number of people
citing each of the domains for both high and low oppor-
tunity conditions; these rankings appear in Table 4. The
mean frequency for the top 6 domains in each condition
was nearly identical for high (13.7%) and low
opportunity (14.0%).
The key question however centers on whether those
life domains that participants selected as high (vs. low) in
opportunity are generally the same as those domains
that participants in Study 2a selected as containing their
biggest regrets. In other words, does the manipulation of
opportunity in the present study explain, at least in part,
the selection of life domains in the previous study? If
individuals’ biggest regrets reside within life domains
marked by high opportunity, then the frequencies in
Study 2a with which particular life domains were
selected as containing big regrets should be more similar
to the set of life domains chosen in the present study’s
high versus low opportunity condition. This was indeed
the case. The mean frequency in the high opportunity
condition was nearly identical to the frequency derived
from Study 2a (13.7% vs. 13.3%), binomial Z = .07, p =
.47, h = 0.01, log odds ratio = 0.03. By contrast, the mean
frequency in the low opportunity condition much
exceeded the frequency derived from Study 2a (14.0%
vs. 5.0%), binomial Z = 2.41, p = .008, h = 0.32, log odds
ratio = 1.03. Another way of capturing this effect is using
Spearman rank order correlations computed across the
full set of 12 domains. This analysis similarly showed a
high correspondence between Study 2a and 2b within
the high opportunity condition, r(10) = .65, p = .02, but
no reliable correspondence within the low opportunity
condition, r(10) = –.21, p = .51. Overall, this pattern indi-
cates that the life domains in which individuals describe
their biggest regrets correspond to those domains in
which individuals see the greatest opportunity. More-
over, these findings represent a direct connection
between the test of opportunity effects in Study 2b and
the ranking of Study 2a. Opportunity breeds regret.
STUDY SET 3
To recap, Study Set 2 was designed to be a conceptual
bridge, linking research on regret rankings to laboratory
manipulations of perceived opportunity. This bridge
raises an important theoretical issue centering on the
timing of measurement, specifically, whether regret is
assessed immediately after an outcome versus recalled
much later.
In Study 2b, we used a retrospective self-report
method in which participants recalled long-lasting
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TABLE 4: Rankings of High Versus Low Opportunity Life Domains
Study 2b Study 2a
Rank Life Area Frequency Frequency
Top six high opportunity
domains
1 Self 28.7 10.0
2 Education 14.9 16.7
3 Health 12.8 3.3
4 Spirituality 10.6 3.3
5 Romance 7.4 26.7
6 Friends 7.4 20
Mean 13.7 13.3
Top six low opportunity
domains
1 Career 21.0 6.7
2 Family 21.0 3.3
3 Finance 16.0 0
4 Education 9.0 16.7
5 Community 9.0 0
6 Spirituality 8.0 3.3
Mean 14.0 5.0
NOTE: Study 2b frequencies reflect the percentage of individuals who
selected a particular life domain as being high versus low in opportu-
nity. Study 2a frequencies reflect number of individuals who catego-
rized their vivid regret as falling within that life domain.
regrets. The opportunity effect revealed by this method
could however reflect either or both of the following two
distinct mechanisms: outcome-evoked effects or post
hoc framing effects. Outcome-evoked effects corre-
spond to the psychological effects (dissonance reduc-
tion or preparation for new action) that follow immedi-
ately from the outcome. For example, failing an exam
evokes immediate regret (“I should have studied
harder”), the intensity of which is moderated by immedi-
ate perceptions of subsequent opportunity. Post hoc
framing effects may come later, as when recalling the
regretted failure a year later. At this later point in time,
framing the recall of this past outcome as high or low in
opportunity may also alter the regret experience: The
same outcome framed as high rather than low in oppor-
tunity might produce greater regret reports. The find-
ings of Study 2b could be interpreted in terms of either
or both mechanisms. Prior laboratory research has very
clearly demonstrated an outcome-evoked opportunity
effect (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002; Markman et al., 1993), but
no past research has examined whether current reports
of past regrets are susceptible to framing effects. We
conducted three experiments to find out.
Studies 3a and 3b used the same within-subjects
design and procedures, differing only in the focal life
domains within which regrets were assessed: “kindness
and respect in friendships” and “trust in romantic rela-
tionships” in 3a and “meeting new friends” and “time
spent with a romantic partner” in 3b. These pairs were
selected (based on a pretest of 24 subareas within the
domains of education, romance, and friendship) so as to
be equivalent in the number and strength of regrets,
importance, and impact on other areas of life. For each
of these life domains, two versions of a persuasive para-
graph were prepared that argued that past psychology
research indicates that most college students have either
high or low opportunity to modify events falling within
that particular life domain. Participants (University of
Illinois undergraduates, Ns = 48, 64) were presented
with a paragraph about two life domains, one arguing
high and the other low opportunity. After reading each
paragraph, participants listed three ways that they had
observed high versus low opportunity in that domain of
their own lives. A manipulation check consisting of two
items assessing perceived opportunity emphasized in the
paragraphs confirmed the success of this manipulation
in both studies: In Study 3a, higher ratings of perceived
opportunity appeared in the high than low opportunity
condition (Ms = 5.15 vs. 4.55), F(1, 46) = 6.48, p = .01, d =
.37; and the same was true in Study 3b (Ms = 5.79 vs.
4.59), F(1, 63) = 49.5, p < .001, d = .43. Participants then
rated the extent of their own regrets within each life
domain using two ratings (frequency and intensity) that
were then combined. Although this framing manipula-
tion was clearly successful, it produced no consistent
effect on the regret ratings. In Study 3a, framing had no
reliable effect on the combined regret index (Ms = 3.46
vs. 3.49), F(1, 46) = .02, p = .89, d = .02. In Study 3b, there
was a marginally significant effect in the opposite direc-
tion (i.e., greater regret for low rather than high oppor-
tunity, Ms = 2.76 vs. 3.10), F(1, 63) = 3.74, p = .06, d = .24.
Study 3c involved a different framing manipulation
based on accessibility experiences (e.g., Schwarz, 1998)
in which participants were asked to generate either
many (eight or six, depending on condition) or few
(two) examples of the opportunities they perceived
within one of four subareas (kindness and respect in
friendships, meeting new friends, time spent with
romantic partners, trust in romantic relationships; N =
199).3 The rationale was that the act of generating eight
examples would be perceived to be more difficult than
generating two examples and that this inference of diffi-
culty would result in the further inference of corre-
spondingly meager opportunity in that domain.
Indexed by perceived difficulty ratings, this manipula-
tion was effective (Ms = 4.61 vs. 4.02, for high and low
opportunity conditions), F(1, 198) = 6.34, p = .01, d = .36.
But again, this framing manipulation had no significant
effect on the combined regret index (Ms = 3.00 vs. 3.05),
F(1, 197) = .07, p = .79, d = .04.
These three experiments suggest that the opportu-
nity effect does not operate via a framing mechanism at
the time of recall of past events (weighted mean d = –.02,
N = 311). Although it is always difficult to draw strong
conclusions from null results, the present findings are
informative given that the manipulations were shown to
be effective and that repeated independent tests were
conducted with substantial statistical power. It seems
then that previously published laboratory demonstra-
tions of outcome-evoked opportunity effects constitute
the principal mechanism by which opportunity breeds
regret.
DISCUSSION
A small but noteworthy subset of previous research on
regret has presented tabulations and rankings of where
in life people’s biggest regrets lie. These reports have
appeared in journals spanning social, personality, devel-
opmental, and gender psychology and until now have not
been summarized comprehensively. In meta-analyzing
these findings we found that overall, Americans regret
choices made in the context of education. Career,
romance, and parenting were ranked two, three, and
four, respectively. Rounding out the top six were regrets
centering on the self and on leisure. That education is
the number one regret finds agreement with national
surveys conducted by Gallup in 1949, 1953, and 1965
(Erskine, 1973).
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Interesting though this ranking may be on its own, the
key question is why this ranking appears as opposed to
some other. More generally, what factor can account for
regret intensity across widely divergent life domains? In
the introduction, we summarized five lines of research
that together reveal an opportunity principle, which is
that greater opportunity breeds regret.
This opportunity principle rests on two mechanisms.
First, foreclosed opportunity differentially activates pro-
cesses of cognitive dissonance reduction (Gilbert &
Ebert, 2002), and second, regret itself spurs corrective
action, pushing people to change decision strategies,
plans, and behaviors so as to improve their life circum-
stances (Roese, 1994; Zeelenberg, 1999); such corrective
action only makes sense when feasible, that is, when
opportunities remain open.
After summarizing these two bodies of work (regret
rankings on one hand, opportunity principle demon-
strations on the other), we next endeavored to make an
empirical connection between the two previously sepa-
rate literatures, regret rankings versus opportunity
effects. To erect this conceptual bridge, we tried to bring
a little of each into our laboratory experiments. We first
measured regrets among college students (Study 2a),
then mapped this new regret ranking onto a manipula-
tion of focus on high versus low opportunity life domains
(Study 2b). We discovered that high opportunity directs
attention to more intense regrets than low opportunity.
We then showed that those life domains that participants
identified in Study 2b as being high rather than low in
opportunity were precisely those domains that were
spontaneously identified in Study 2a as vividly regretful.
This research thus demonstrated the link between per-
ceived opportunity and regret intensity while at the same
time connecting this relation directly to a content-based
ranking of regret.
Accordingly, education is the number one regret at
least in part because in contemporary society, new and
further education of one sort or another is available to
nearly all individuals. From community college to pot-
tery classes, from professional certification to high
school equivalency, no matter one’s age, talent, or life
circumstance, going back to school remains an open
opportunity for most Americans. Moreover, education is
widely recognized to be a gateway to numerous other val-
ued consequences, from higher income to more chal-
lenging career to wider diversity of social contacts. Edu-
cation is therefore a means to achieving several
important ends, and any of these ends gone awry might
have been avoided with more education. For reasons
such as this, we do not expect the same ranking of regrets
to appear in other cultures, although we would expect
that perceived opportunity will underlie whatever rank-
ing is uncovered (cf., Gilovich, Wang, Regan, Nishina,
2003). Indeed, striking differences in cultures may be
predicted on the basis of social-structural constraints on
individual behavior. In contemporary American society,
individuals enjoy great freedom of choice when it comes
to education and career, but in caste-based societies,
such as those in the recent past in India and Great Brit-
ain, education and career were constrained at birth. It
seems extremely plausible that individuals in caste-based
societies experience far fewer life regrets centering on
education and career than contemporary Americans. By
the same token, contemporary Americans have enor-
mous freedom in dating, marriage, and divorce, yet it
was not always this way. Might regrets centering on
romance be more common today than they were a
century ago, when people married young, divorced
rarely, and saw few opportunities for alternative
romantic partners?
Limitations and Implications
The meta-analysis of previous content analyses of life
regrets was intriguing, yet a few limitations invite new
follow-up research. First, the 11 data sets were samples of
convenience (with the well educated overrepresented),
precluding confidence in the ranking’s generality. The
one “representative” sample was representative only of
Lafayette, Indiana, a predominantly White, midwestern
town. Even so, that education represents the number
one life regret of Americans can be fairly confidently
concluded given the confirmation of this finding in rep-
resentative surveys conducted in earlier decades (Ers-
kine, 1973). The exact ranking of the remainder of this
list however might be verified with a survey using a
sample representative of the nation as a whole.
Second, for several of the studies summarized by
meta-analysis, the life domain categories were presented
to participants before they rated their regrets; these peo-
ple then decided whether they had experienced a spe-
cific regret corresponding to each category. Such an
approach may exaggerate frequencies by cuing recall,
missing the more interesting question of what it is that
people report when not prompted with specific life
domains. It may also heighten demand characteristics in
that it may suggest to participants that they cite regrets
that may make them look good or that the experimenter
wants to hear. Some studies used the somewhat better
approach of soliciting salient regrets first and only later
categorizing these into life domains (typically done by
independent coders). In our Study 2a, we used this latter
approach but required participants themselves to cate-
gorize their own regrets into life domains, thus to some
extent reducing the interpretive ambiguity that might
affect independent coders.
In characterizing the regret ranking by pointing to
the role of opportunity, it seems clear that opportunity is
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but one of several determinants of regret intensity. Past
research has described other determinants, such as the
interplay between action versus inaction and temporal
perspective (regrets of action are more intense in the
short term; regrets of inaction are more intense over the
long term; Gilovich & Medvec, 1995; Zeelenberg, van
der Pligt, & Manstead, 1998). Our Study 2b showed that
opportunity is related to importance in that the most
painful regrets are to be found in those life domains that
are most important to people. But our research is the
first to support the somewhat counterintuitive claim that
people’s biggest regrets in life are in part a reflection of
where in life they see the most opportunity for
improvement.
A Theoretical Synthesis of
the Opportunity Principle
Our analysis of the opportunity principle may be sum-
marized concisely in terms of three distinct stages at
which opportunity effects may or may not occur with
regard to regret experiences. These three stages are
action, outcome, and recall (see Figure 2). At the action
stage, the individual engages in goal-directed behaviors
prior to a focal outcome, such as studying before an
exam. It is at this stage that research from the cognitive
dissonance literature may be brought to bear. As this lit-
erature itself made clear, regret is an example of cogni-
tive dissonance (Brehm & Wicklund, 1970; Festinger &
Walster, 1964; Wicklund & Brehm, 1976). For any subse-
quent experience of regret (or dissonance) to occur, the
individual must believe that actions have been freely
chosen (Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967). If actions have
been constrained by outside forces, the individual seizes
on these external attributions and hence feels no disso-
nance, no regret, and no self-blame (“The power failure
prevented me from studying”; e.g., Cooper & Fazio,
1984). The next stage is the outcome stage, at which the
goal is either successfully or unsuccessfully achieved.
Almost by definition, regret does not occur for successes,
but a failure following from freely chosen actions will
evoke regret, which embodies thoughts of alternative
actions that might have brought about success. It is at this
outcome stage that the opportunity principle operates.
As shown in laboratory experiments in which an actual
experience is accompanied by beliefs in either low or
high opportunities to implement new corrective action
(e.g., Gilbert & Ebert, 2002; Markman et al., 1993), high
opportunity exacerbates regret, whereas low opportu-
nity initiates processes of dissonance reduction (which
mitigate the experience of regret). But importantly,
regret (dissonance) is likely to appear at this outcome
stage only to the extent that there was a belief in free
choice during the action stage. Finally, at the recall stage,
an individual might remember a past experience regret-
fully, and some regrets linger for long periods of time
(Gilovich & Medvec, 1995). At this recall stage, regret
intensity might reflect recollections of the opportunity
perceived during the outcome stage, but our research
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Nature of Effect:  Perceived free 
choice of actions and decisions 
is necessary for later regret (or 
cognitive dissonance) to 
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Nature of Effect:  High perceived 
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regret that is evoked by failure 
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mitigates regret by activating 
processes of dissonance 
reduction. 
Nature of Effect:  Past outcome 
framed as high versus low in 
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ongoing regret experience (i.e., 
no framing effects). 
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Key Demonstration:  Linder et al. 
(1967) 
Key Demonstration:  Markman et 
al. (1993) 
Key Demonstration:  Study Set 
3, this article. 
Figure 2 A summary of opportunity effects on regret.
rules out the possibility that framing of the past as high
or low in opportunity during this recall stage itself alters
the regret experience. Rather, recall of past regret expe-
riences reflects the opportunity principle as primarily an
outcome-evoked process: Consideration of future
opportunity in the immediate aftermath of the outcome
moderates regret intensity and accordingly whether this
regret lingers over longer periods of time.
Coda
Opportunity breeds regret, and so regret lingers where
opportunity existed. Rankings of life regrets, interesting
in and of themselves, point to this deeper theoretical
principle. Life regrets are a reflection of where in life
people see opportunity, that is, where they see the most
tangible prospects for change, growth, and renewal.
NOTES
1. One commonly cited paper did not appear in the meta-analysis
(Metha, Kinnier, & McWhirter, 1989) because it seemed that its data
were redundant to those presented in Kinnier and Metha (1989). The
only apparent difference is that the former paper reports data for the
female participant subset included in the latter paper.
2. Proportion of men and women are estimates, not exact values, as
two of the nine studies did not report sex of subject information (an
even split was thus assumed). The oversampling of women derives
largely from Landman and Manis’s (1992) second data set, which
included 1,145 women and no men. Sex differences are almost com-
pletely absent from the literature of counterfactual thinking and
regret, a null finding that extends to the studies reviewed here. Women
and men are remarkably similar in the aspects of life that they regret
most, hence the oversampling poses little concern regarding the
generalizability of this meta-analysis.
3. The number of examples listed (two, six, or eight) was developed
from the number of examples generated during pretesting of 55 partic-
ipants. The modal number of examples generated in each domain was
multiplied by .5 to set the number for the few condition and 1.5 to set
the number for the many condition, a procedure recommended by
N. Schwarz (personal communication, November 5, 2004; see also
Schwarz, 1998). These values were rounded to the more extreme whole
number so that a value of 2.5 for example was rounded down to 2 for
the few condition and a value of 7.5 was rounded up to 8 for the many
condition.
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